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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 After a four and one-half year hiatus, the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation attempted to reopen its case against 
Pabst Brewing Co. and Anheuser-Busch, Inc. for unfunded benefits 
in a terminated pension fund.  The district court dismissed the 
case for lack of prosecution under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) and denied as untimely the PBGC's motion for 
reconsideration. 
 The PBGC appeals contending the district court abused 
its discretion in dismissing the case.  The PBGC also claims its 
motion for reconsideration was timely, and that due process 
required notice and a hearing before dismissal. 
 We hold the district court correctly found the motion 
for reconsideration was untimely, and that the PBGC received 
adequate notice.  Nonetheless, without considering the evidence 
the PBGC proffered with its motion for reconsideration,  
we find the district court should not have dismissed the case 
with prejudice.  We agree that the PBGC's behavior was negligent 
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and inexcusable, but think dismissal was too harsh a sanction. 
Therefore we will remand for reinstatement of the case and 
consideration of lesser sanctions. 
I. 
 In 1956, Pabst, Anheuser-Busch, and other breweries 
entered into an agreement with the New Jersey Brewers' 
Association, the Brewery Workers Joint Local Executive Board of 
New Jersey, and certain of its local unions to establish the "New 
Jersey Brewery Workers Trust Fund" (the Fund).  Each brewery 
negotiated periodic collective bargaining agreements specifying 
the amount it would contribute to the Fund, which was to provide 
brewery workers' retirement pensions. 
 As employment in the brewing industry declined in the 
late 1960s, the Fund's unfunded liabilities mounted, exceeding 
$50 million by 1970.  To protect its solvency and reduce the 
actuarial deficit, the Fund's trustees adopted a Partial 
Termination Clause, limiting benefits for participants whose 
employers had withdrawn from the fund.   
 In 1973, Pabst and Anheuser-Busch (collectively, the 
Breweries) withdrew from the Fund and set up separate funds for 
their employees.  Other breweries also withdrew throughout the 
1970's.  In 1978 the Fund was terminated and the PBGC was 
appointed statutory trustee under Title IV of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1342(b)&(c) 
(1988).  
 Coinciding with the termination, 29 employees (the 
Employees) sued Pabst, Anheuser-Busch, other breweries, the Fund, 
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its trustees, and the PBGC, for benefits under the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 185 & 186 (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992), and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1302, 1303 (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992).  In 1979, the PBGC was substituted for the 
Trustees, and the Employees added a fifth count solely against 
the PBGC, seeking a declaration that the PBGC was required to 
guarantee them certain nonforfeitable rights to pension benefits. 
A class was certified for this count. 
 The PBGC filed cross-claims against Pabst, Anheuser-
Busch, and Rheingold (another brewery), seeking employer 
indemnification under 29 U.S.C. § 1364 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) for 
benefits the PBGC might be required to pay employees under 29 
U.S.C. § 1322.0  The PBGC filed a similar claim against Chock-
Full O'Nuts Corp., parent company of Rheingold.0  The Breweries 
filed cross-claims against the PBGC seeking to recover or offset 
                     
0Subject to a number of qualifications, 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) 
(Supp. IV 1992) provides that the PBGC will "guarantee . . . the 
payment of all nonforfeitable benefits . . . under a single-
employer plan" in the event of its termination.  "Single-employer 
plans" include plans such as this one to which a number of 
employers contribute, each pursuant to an individual collective 
bargaining agreement with its respective employee organization. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3)&(b)(2) (1988). 
 Section 1364, "Liability of employers on termination of 
plan maintained by more than one employer," assigns liability for 
unfunded benefits of such single-employer plans to all employers 
maintaining it or who made contributions to it in any of the five 
years preceding its termination.  It also provides that the PBGC 
will determine the liability of each employer and gives the 
formula for so doing.  The formula essentially divides the plan's 
unfunded benefits among all employers in proportion to what each 
employer should have contributed during the plan's last five 
years of operation.  Id. § 1364 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
0Claims between the PBGC and Rheingold and Chock-Full O' Nuts 
were later dismissed by stipulation. 
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their liability to the PBGC because of payments into both the 
Fund and the individual corporate plans.   
 All parties filed summary judgment motions.  On 
September 22, 1980, the district court granted summary judgment 
to the Employees against the PBGC on the fifth count, holding 
that the Partial Termination Clause was invalid; and granted 
summary judgment against the Employees on all their other claims. 
Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 299 (D.N.J. 1980). 
Thus, all causes of action by the Employees against the Breweries 
were disposed of, but the Employees' claims against the PBGC 
continued, as did the cross-claims between the PBGC and the 
Breweries. 
 On appeal, we reversed the district court only on the 
summary judgment for the Employees on the fifth count, holding 
the Partial Termination Clause was not void.  We remanded, 
however, for determination of whether the Employees received 
proper notification of the clause.  Adams v. New Jersey Brewery 
Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 670 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 After discovery on the notice issue, the PBGC and the 
Employees renewed their summary judgment motions, and the 
Breweries filed for summary judgment to dismiss the PBGC cross-
claims for statutory employer indemnification.  Because ERISA was 
not enacted until 1975, the Breweries claimed that statutory 
employer liability was not meant to apply to employers who had 
withdrawn from the Trust Fund in 1973, and in the alternative, 
that such liability would violate the Due Process Clause. 
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 On October 7, 1983, after the case was transferred to 
another judge, the district court granted the Employees' summary 
judgment motion on the fifth count, holding they did not receive 
adequate notice of the Partial Termination Clause.  The court 
denied Pabst and Anheuser-Busch's summary judgment motions, 
ruling that liability was appropriate under 29 U.S.C. § 1364 and 
the Due Process Clause.  The court certified the issues for 
interlocutory review.   
 On a second appeal, we reversed the grant of summary 
judgment for the Employees, holding they received adequate 
constructive notice of the Partial Termination Clause as a matter 
of law.  Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 755 F.2d 330, 332 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  We declined to address the certified questions, and 
remanded "for a final determination of the employers' liability 
on the PBGC's cross-claim for any remaining unfunded portions of 
the Brewery Pension Fund."  Id. at 336.   
 On October 1, 1986, the district court granted the 
PBGC's motion to dismiss the Breweries' cross-claims against the 
PBGC for reduction of their statutory liability based on their 
payments to the Employees through their corporate pension plans. 
The court also denied the Breweries' motion for reconsideration 
of their due process objection to liability under 29 U.S.C. 
§1364. 
 In January, 1987, after the case was transferred to yet 
another judge, the Employees again raised their claims for 
guaranteed benefits from the PBGC.  The court held we had ruled 
with finality that the Partial Termination Clause defeated those 
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claims, and granted summary judgment to the PBGC against the 
Employees.  Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,  C.A. No. 77-2543 
(D.N.J.March 17, 1988) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).  We 
affirmed by judgment order, October 4, 1988. Adams v. Trustees of 
the New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, No. 88-5305 
(3d Cir. Oct. 4, 1988) (judgment order). 
 Following our affirmance, the only claims remaining 
were the PBGC's cross-claims against the Breweries for employer 
indemnification.  From October, 1988 to March, 1993 there was no 
contact among the parties and the court, although the PBGC 
engaged in limited, informal discovery with third parties on 
these claims.  In December, 1992, the PBGC contacted the district 
court and was informed by the clerk that the case had been 
administratively closed.  On March 19, 1993, the PBGC moved to 
reopen the case, seeking summary judgment against the Breweries. 
Without explaining the four and one-half year break in pursuing 
its claims, the PBGC contended the only remaining issue in the 
case was the amount of the Breweries' liability and described how 
that liability should be calculated.  In response, Anheuser-Busch 
argued that the case should be dismissed under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41(b), noting that the court could do so sua 
sponte and discussing the relevant factors for dismissal.  Pabst 
included in its letter response a form for an order denying the 
PBGC's motion to reopen and dismissing the case with prejudice. 
Neither party, however, formally moved for dismissal with 
prejudice. 
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 In reply, the PBGC argued that the court should regard 
the administrative closure of the case as a clerical mistake and 
reopen under Rule 60(a).  The PBGC responded to some of the 
Breweries' assertions -- whether the PBGC was inappropriately 
seeking relief under Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) (relief from a 
final judgment) and whether the case had in fact already been 
dismissed -- but did not explain its delay in prosecution, 
contending that a dismissal under Rule 41(b) would be 
inappropriate because it had not failed to comply with any 
procedural rules or court orders, and that the defendants had not 
moved for dismissal. 
 On June 7, 1993, the district court dismissed the 
PBGC's claims under Rule 41(b).  Noting that the PBGC had given 
no explanation for its dilatory conduct, the court said that for 
equitable reasons it would sua sponte treat the defendants' 
motions and responses as a 41(b) motion to dismiss for lack of 
prosecution.  Acknowledging that a dismissal for lack of 
prosecution was a harsh sanction because it operates as an 
adjudication on the merits, the court evaluated the case in light 
of the six factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), and found all factors 
pointed toward dismissal except the factor evaluating the merits 
of the PBGC's case. 
 On June 24, 1993, the PBGC filed a motion under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for alteration or amendment of the 
dismissal order.  The PBGC submitted an explanation of the delay 
in prosecution, describing how the case was shifted from one 
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overloaded attorney to another, and documented a small amount of 
"informal discovery" during the hiatus, consisting of a few 
letters between the PBGC and consultants or fund managers.  The 
court denied the motion as untimely, noting that Rule 59(e)'s 
ten-day time limit was jurisdictional.  The court also stated 
that had the motion been timely, it would have affirmed its prior 
holding, having found nothing in the proffered arguments and 
documents giving cause for reconsideration.   
 The PBGC filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction of the PBGC's ERISA 
employer liability claim against the Breweries under 29 U.S.C. 
§1303(e)(3).  The court's dismissal of that claim and its denial 
of the motion for reconsideration are final orders.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 The motion for reconsideration was denied because a 
jurisdictional time limit had expired.  We exercise "plenary 
review of the district court's choice and interpretation of 
applicable tolling principles,"  Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. 
2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991), and of 
jurisdictional decisions by the district court, Anthuis v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1992).  The 
question of whether due process required formal notice and a 
hearing before dismissal is also subject to plenary review. 
Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1370 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990). 
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 We review the dismissal for failure to prosecute under 
Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion.  "The question, of course, is 
not whether [the Supreme] Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, 
would as an original matter have dismissed the action; it is 
whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing."  
National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 
642 (1976) (per curiam).  While we defer to the discretion of the 
district court, we are mindful that dismissal with prejudice is 
only appropriate in limited circumstances:  "Because [an order of 
dismissal] deprives a party of its day in court, our precedent 
requires that we carefully review each such case to ascertain 
whether the district court abused its discretion in applying such 
an extreme sanction," Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 875 
(3d Cir. 1984), and in this review "doubts should be resolved in 
favor of reaching a decision on the merits,"  id. at 878. 
III. 
  Rule 59(e) requires a motion for reconsideration 
to "be served not later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  Rule 6(a) provides that in 
computing any time period under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
day of the event from which the designated period of time begins 
to run shall not be included, nor shall intermediate Saturdays, 
Sundays, or legal holidays, if the period is less than eleven 
days.  Rule 6(b) provides that the time limit of Rule 59(e) may 
not be judicially extended; as we have explained, the ten-day 
period "is jurisdictional, and cannot be extended in the 
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discretion of the district court."  Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 
666, 669 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). 
 The district court's order denying the PBGC's motion to 
reopen the case and dismissing it with prejudice was dated May 
25, 1993, and docketed June 7.  The PBGC served a "Motion to 
Alter or Amend the Judgment" under Rule 59(e), with accompanying 
affidavits and documents, on June 24.  Not counting weekend days, 
ten days after June 7 would be June 21.  Therefore, the June 24 
service by PBGC was not timely.0 
 The PBGC argues that Rule 6(e) extended the deadline by 
three days, rendering its motion timely.  Rule 6(e) provides:   
Whenever a party has the right or is required 
to do some act or take some proceedings 
within a prescribed period after the service 
of a notice or other paper upon the party and 
the notice or paper is served upon the party 
by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (emphasis added).  The PBGC claims that 
since they were "served" the judgment of the court by mail, the 
rule applies to extend the period. 
 The Rule 6(e) extension is inapplicable here.  Rule 
59(e) gives the right to move for reconsideration "not later than 
10 days after entry of the judgment." (Emphasis added.)  Thus, 
the period for bringing the 59(e) motion begins with "entry of 
judgment."  Rule 6(e) only extends time limits that begin with 
                     
0The district court apparently considered the date the PBGC's 
59(e) motion was docketed, June 28, rather than the date of 
service, June 24, as the relevant event to end the 59(e) period. 
However, the error was harmless since, as shown above, June 24 
also falls outside the time limit. 
14 
"service of a notice or other paper upon the party."  See, e.g., 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (requiring defendant's service of 
answer "within 20 days after being served with the summons and 
complaint"). 
 This facial reading is explicitly supported by our 
caselaw.  In Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. v. Nowalk, 420 F.2d 858 
(3d Cir. 1970), a party claimed the time limit for his Rule 59(e) 
motion should be extended by three days under Rule 6(e).  He 
asserted "that since the Clerk notified the parties by mail of 
entry of the judgment, he should have had three additional days 
within which to serve the motion."  Id. at 860.  We stated, "it 
appears that filing of a motion such as defendant's [59(e) 
motion] is not conditioned upon notice of entry of judgment," and 
concluded 6(e) did not apply.  Id. 
IV. 
 The PBGC argues in the alternative that the dismissal 
violates due process, or constitutes an abuse of discretion, 
because there was no formal notice or hearing.  We find the PBGC 
had adequate notice of the dismissal, and forewent its 
opportunities to respond.    
 Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) gives 
guidance on notice and hearings prior to 41(b) dismissals.  Link 
sued Wabash Railroad in U.S. district court in 1954 after his car 
collided with a Wabash train.  After three years he prevailed 
against Wabash's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a 
trial date was set but then vacated by the court.  In 1959, after 
three years of little activity, the court initiated a hearing to 
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show cause why it should not dismiss.  Deciding to retain the 
case, the court set a trial date for July, 1959, which it later 
vacated at the defendant's request.  More interrogatories were 
exchanged, and a pre-trial conference was set for October, 1960. 
On the day of the conference, Link's lawyer called and said he 
was in another city doing other work, and asked that the 
conference be rescheduled.  The court declined, and dismissed the 
case with prejudice for failure of plaintiff's counsel to appear 
and failure to prosecute as an exercise of its inherent power. 
Id. at 627-29. 
 The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court could 
dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b).  The Court further held that 
"the absence of notice as to the possibility of dismissal or the 
failure to hold an adversary hearing" does not "necessarily 
render such a dismissal void."  Id. at 632.  It explained: 
It is true, of course, that the fundamental 
requirement of due process is an opportunity 
to be heard upon such notice and proceedings 
as are adequate to safeguard the right for 
which the constitutional protection is 
invoked.  But this does not mean that every 
order entered without notice and a 
preliminary adversary hearing offends due 
process.  The adequacy of notice and hearing 
respecting proceedings that may affect a 
party's rights turns, to a considerable 
extent, on the knowledge which the 
circumstances show such party may be taken to 
have of the consequences of his own conduct. 
The circumstances here were such as to 
dispense with the necessity for advance 
notice and hearing. 
 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  The Court also 
stated that the availability of relief from judgment for mistake, 
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excusable neglect, etc., under Rule 60(b), which the plaintiff 
had not sought, "renders the lack of prior notice of less 
consequence."  Id. 
 The circumstances in Link showing the plaintiff should 
have known it risked dismissal included three years of 
inactivity, a motion from the court to show cause why the case 
should not be dismissed after three years of inactivity, the 
plaintiff's failure to answer interrogatories, and, on the day of 
dismissal, the plaintiff's attorney's missing a pretrial 
conference.  Id. at 629 n.2, 634-35 n.11.  Under these 
circumstances, an attorney should be on notice that dismissal may 
ensue, so that advance notice is not required, especially where 
Rule 60(b) provides an "escape hatch" by allowing the reopening 
of cases inadvisedly closed.  Id. at 632. 
 While the harshness of dismissal with prejudice 
generally counsels giving formal notice in advance, the PBGC had 
adequate opportunity to defend itself against dismissal without 
such formal notice.  Before dismissal, the PBGC did not engage in 
problematic behavior like the Link plaintiff:  there had been no 
previous hearing to show cause why the court should not dismiss, 
the PBGC had met discovery requests, and it did not miss any 
court appointments.  But other factors clearly warned the PBGC it 
risked dismissal:  Anheuser-Busch's brief argued for 41(b) 
dismissal and went through the 6-factor Poulis analysis, and 
Pabst included a draft of a dismissal order in its response to 
the motion to reopen.  Even if these factors alone did not put 
the PBGC on notice, the balance is tipped by the availability of 
17 
the Rule 59(e) motion.  After the court's order of dismissal, the 
PBGC had the opportunity to present its explanation of the delay 
in a motion to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal under 
Rule 59(e).  Like the plaintiff in Link, the PBGC did not avail 
itself of this escape hatch.0  Having foregone this opportunity, 
the PBGC cannot claim it was denied due process or that the court 
abused its discretion because of a lack of notice and hearing. 
 Notwithstanding, the PBGC argues that we should extend 
it the right to notice and a hearing before dismissal under 
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d 
Cir. 1987).  We disagree.  In Dunbar, observing no evidence 
implicating the client in the attorney's dilatory behavior and 
bad faith, we expressed concern over the trend of dismissal of 
legal actions for dereliction of duty by counsel.  To protect 
litigants, we held that any motion to dismiss by court or counsel 
"based on an apparent default on the part of litigant's counsel" 
be pleaded with particularity and with supporting material, and 
that "where the papers demonstrate reasonable grounds for 
dismissal on that basis the court shall direct the clerk of the 
court to mail notice directly to the litigant of the time and 
place of a hearing on any such motion."  Id. at 129.  This is to 
"put the client on notice of possible jeopardy to his or her 
legal interests by counsel's conduct at a time when the client 
                     
0The motion filed outside of the jurisdictional time limit was as 
good as no motion at all.  There is irony in a party's seeking to 
explain why its delay in prosecuting a case is excusable rather 
than dilatory, but missing the deadline for making the 
explanation.   
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can take appropriate action and when the Poulis balance has not 
been irretrievably struck in favor of the moving party."  Id. 
 The PBGC argues that without Dunbar protection, parties 
with in-house counsel, such as the government, will unfairly 
suffer dismissal without the formal warning given to parties with 
outside counsel.  However, Dunbar specifically establishes 
special procedural protection for parties with outside counsel in 
order to benefit the client that had no part in, and no knowledge 
of, its attorney's delinquent behavior.  Where a client had or 
should have had independent knowledge of the delinquency that was 
the grounds for dismissal, we have held notice and hearing are 
not required.  See  Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 
1147 (3d Cir. 1990) (no Dunbar proceedings required where 
plaintiff had been personally sanctioned for misconduct and had 
issued certifications contesting dismissal); Curtis T. Bedwell & 
Sons, Inc. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693 
(3d Cir. 1988) (no Dunbar proceedings required where plaintiff 
present at hearings regarding attorney's misconduct and possible 
sanctions).  Without formal notice and hearing, a responsible 
client might be unaware that its attorney is risking dismissal; a 
party with in-house counsel, however, is deemed to be aware of 
how its case is proceeding, and of circumstances indicating 
dismissal may be imminent.  The PBGC, represented by in-house 
counsel, is held to have known whatever its agents, including its 
attorneys, knew.  It merits no further notice than that required 
in Link.   
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 Because the PBGC has already had (and failed to use) 
adequate opportunity to present its excuses on the delay, we will 
not consider the affidavits and documents it submitted with its 
motion for reconsideration.  We do not, however, accept Pabst's 
contention that we should also refuse to consider the legal 
arguments against dismissal the PBGC now raises on appeal.  While 
"[w]e can consider the record only as it existed at the time the 
court below made the order dismissing the action," Jaconski v. 
Avisun Corp., 359 F.2d 931, 936 n.11 (3d Cir. 1966), the party is 
not required to test its legal arguments before the district 
court in a Rule 59(e) motion before making them on appeal.  We 
have discretion to hear not only arguments but also claims raised 
for the first time on appeal, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 
121 (1975).   
V. 
 In evaluating whether the district court abused its 
discretion in dismissing with prejudice, our review is "guided by 
the manner in which the trial court balanced [six] factors . . . 
and whether the record supports its findings."  Poulis, 747 F.2d 
at 868.  The six factors are: 
(1)  the extent of the party's personal 
responsibility;  
(2)  the prejudice to the adversary caused by 
the failure to meet scheduling orders and 
respond to discovery;0   
(3)  a history of dilatoriness;  
(4)  whether the conduct of the party or the 
attorney was willful or in bad faith;  
                     
0In evaluating Rule 41(b) dismissals, we look more generally for 
"[p]rejudice to the other party."  Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 876. 
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(5)  the effectiveness of sanctions other 
than dismissal, which entails an analysis of 
alternative sanctions; and  
(6)  the meritoriousness or the claim or 
defense. 
 
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. 
 The district court thoroughly considered all of the six 
Poulis categories, and found all except meritoriousness indicated 
dismissal.  We likewise will consider each factor in turn. 
  1.  The party's personal responsibility 
a.   
 Although a party may justly suffer dismissal "because 
of his counsel's unexcused conduct," Link, 370 U.S. at 633, we 
"have increasingly emphasized visiting sanctions directly on the 
delinquent lawyer, rather than on a client who is not actually at 
fault."  Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 
807 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Burns v. MacMeekin, 722 F.2d 32, 35 
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding district court must consider alternative 
remedy to dismissal, because "[t]he brunt of the order [to 
dismiss] falls on plaintiffs, who have been deprived of the 
opportunity to litigate their case on the merits, when the only 
culpable party may be their attorney.").  Thus, in determining 
whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party 
bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which 
led to the dismissal. 
b.   
 The district court held the PBGC personally 
responsible, explaining, "[t]his is not the sympathetic situation 
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of an innocent client suffering the sanction of dismissal due to 
dilatory counsel whom it hired to represent it."  Michota v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc, C.A. No. 77-2543, slip op. at 7 (D.N.J. May 
25, 1993).  We agree.  The PBGC is personally responsible for 
delay by its in-house counsel. 
 We do not accept the PBGC's argument that because it 
administers a pension guarantee program in which employers 
participate, we should consider the employers' lack of personal 
responsibility for the delay.  The PBGC contends that because 
those employers pay premiums into a common fund that backs 
pension funds, they will have to pay higher premiums to cover the 
loss if the PBGC cannot prosecute this case.  The focus on a 
party's personal responsibility, the PBGC argues, is to protect 
innocent parties such as these participants in ERISA's Title IV 
program, so for their sake dismissal is inappropriate. 
 While it may be true that the PBGC's loss would 
eventually be passed on to parties who were not responsible, the 
personal responsibility criterion does not aim to protect all 
innocent victims from dismissal of a case.  If it did, a vast 
range of parties could claim immunity from dismissal to prevent 
suffering to third parties.  Carter and Dunbar aim to protect 
clients who try their best to litigate cases properly, but are 
thwarted by their attorneys' delinquent behavior.  Where, as 
here, a party is personally responsible for failure to prosecute, 
the effect of dismissal on third parties cannot be dispositive. 
  2.  Prejudice to adversary 
a. 
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 Evidence of prejudice to an adversary "would bear 
substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default 
judgment."  Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 876.  Examples of prejudice 
include "the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable 
dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly 
irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party."  
Id.  Prejudice also includes deprivation of information through 
non-cooperation with discovery, and costs expended obtaining 
court orders to force compliance with discovery.  Bedwell, 843 
F.2d at 693.  Prejudice need not be "irremediable harm that could 
not be alleviated by [the] court's reopening discovery and 
postponing trial."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original). 
b. 
 The district court held that the defendants would be 
prejudiced by the amount of interest they would have to pay on 
their liability, which would exceed the liability itself, and by 
the difficulty of mounting a defense so long after the events at 
issue.  We cannot agree. 
 Interest paid on money owed does not amount to 
prejudice, but rather represents the value of possession of the 
money by the debtor.  It is the amount the Breweries should have 
made on their money if they had kept it prudently invested during 
these 17 years.  If the resolution of this case is that they had 
no right to the money in the first place, neither do they have 
right to the value they have gained from it while the case was 
litigated. 
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 The argument that the delay will prejudice the 
Breweries' defense, though not meritless, is ultimately 
unconvincing.  The PBGC claims the determination of the 
employer's statutory liability for unfunded portions of the 
Brewery Pension Fund involves computing, as of the date of plan 
termination, the value of the plan's assets and the participants' 
guaranteed benefits, and determining Anheuser-Busch's and Pabst's 
proportionate share of liability for the unfunded benefits.  See 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  The PBGC asserts that 
if there are any genuine issues of material fact, the evidence 
will be computational or documentary. 
 The Breweries contend that each side will call expert 
witnesses and fact witnesses, including the Fund's actuary, to 
testify on the status and investments of the Fund in the 1970s 
before and after termination.  They would also reargue their 
claims regarding the applicability of ERISA to employers who 
withdrew from a fund before ERISA's enactment. 
 We do not see much if any prejudice resulting from the 
delay.  The Breweries do not challenge the PBGC's 
characterization of the computation process, which is a records-
based determination.  Expert witnesses would only comment on 
evidence; there should be no problem with dimmed memories. 
Similarly, fact witnesses would rely primarily on records to 
describe the fund's history.  The Breweries have claimed neither 
that any records have been lost, nor that their discovery is 
incomplete.  Even if trial had taken place in 1988 after our last 
ruling, the case still would have turned on events over a decade 
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old -- the Breweries' withdrawal in 1973 and the Fund's 
termination in 1977.  Finally, we note that the Breweries' 
principal contentions are statutory and constitutional arguments 
on whether ERISA properly applies to them, and these could be 
made at any time. 
 It is possible the Breweries may suffer some prejudice 
from this delay, in the form of additional costs or lost 
information.  But there has been no testimony to this effect, and 
such prejudice, if it exists, would be minor and appropriately 
addressed by more modest sanctions than dismissal. 
  3.  History of dilatoriness 
a.  
 Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes 
a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to 
interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court 
orders.  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868;  Comdyne I, 908 F.2d at 1148. 
On the other hand, "sloppiness" while an attorney is moving 
offices that results in untimely response to two court orders and 
a late retention of local counsel does not amount to "a pattern 
of deliberate dilatory action," Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1982), and "inexcusable" 
lateness of one or two weeks in meeting four court deadlines is 
not a "default comparable to Poulis," where the plaintiff was 
non-responsive and tardy, Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 875. 
 Furthermore, a party's problematic acts must be 
evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of the case.  In 
Dyotherm Corp. v. Turbo Machine Co., 392 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1968), 
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we overturned a dismissal for want of prosecution, despite 
Dyotherm's failure to inform the court of its activities as 
requested, its late and unprepared appearance at trial without 
its key witness, and its failure to produce an adequate excuse 
for the witness's absence.  While acknowledging the inexcusable 
behavior of plaintiff's counsel, we noted, among other mitigating 
factors, that there was no indication of dilatory tactics during 
the first two and a half years in which the case was litigated. 
Id. at 149. 
b.   
 The district court found that "[t]he history of 
dilatoriness also favors dismissal," and said it was at a loss to 
understand why the PBGC had stopped prosecution so abruptly or 
why it began again after so long.  Michota, slip op. at 8.  We 
agree the failure to prosecute for more than four years amounts 
to a history of dilatoriness. 
 Four and one-half years is a significant and 
inexcusable delay, and could constitute grounds for dismissal 
under Rule 41(b): 
"[F]ailure to prosecute" under the Rule 41(b) 
does not mean that the plaintiff must have 
taken any positive steps to delay the trial 
or prevent it from being reached by operation 
of the regular machinery of the court.  It is 
quite sufficient if he does nothing, knowing 
that until something is done there will be no 
trial. 
 
Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 32 F.R.D. 375, 377 (E.D. Pa. 
1962), aff'd 314 F.2d 944 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 817 (1963).   
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 This history of dilatoriness weighs toward, but does 
not mandate, dismissal.  The delay here is not on the scale of 
that in Bendix, where the case lay dormant for 11 years, id. at 
376, nor was there dilatoriness as in Bedwell, where the 
plaintiff repeatedly and strategically delayed and disobeyed 
court orders.  Bedwell, 843 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1988).  There has 
been no dispute that the PBGC has met all deadlines and court 
dates during the course of the litigation.  Under Dyotherm the 
four and one-half year delay is somewhat mitigated by the PBGC's 
ten years of responsible litigation.   
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  4.  Was the attorney's conduct 
      willful or in bad faith? 
a.   
 In evaluating a dismissal, this court looks for "the 
type of willful or contumacious behavior which was characterized 
as `flagrant bad faith,' in National Hockey League, [427 U.S. at 
643]."  Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 875; see also Poulis, 747 F.2d 
at 866.  In National Hockey League, the district court dismissed 
the case after 17 months in which the plaintiffs failed to answer 
crucial interrogatories despite numerous extensions, and broke 
promises and commitments to the court.  The Supreme Court 
approved the dismissal as a proper response to such behavior. 
 Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving 
behavior.  In Donnelly, when the plaintiff's case was transferred 
from Texas to New Jersey, he was tardy meeting court orders to 
obtain New Jersey counsel.  We held the plaintiff's difficulties 
did not amount to an inability to comply, but rather, "[a]t best 
. . . show[ed] a failure to move with the dispatch which the 
notice and order to show cause required, and provide[d] no basis 
for exculpation of plaintiff's Texas counsel on the grounds of 
inability."  Donnelly, 677 F.2d at 342.  Noting, however, that 
the Texas lawyer had timely attempted to locate local counsel, we 
also held, "no willfulness is mirrored in the record."  Id. at 
343 (internal quotation omitted).  Thus, tardiness not excused 
for inability is not necessarily willful.  See also Scarborough, 
747 F.2d at 875 (where attorney filed all required papers, albeit 
some tardily, behavior was not willful or contumacious); c.f. 
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Bedwell, 843 F.2d at 695 (where plaintiff and attorney did not 
comply with court orders and discovery requests without plausible 
excuses and delay appeared to be calculated, district court 
properly found conduct willful, not merely negligent). 
b. 
 The district court considered that it had received no 
explanation from the PBGC regarding the four and one-half year 
hiatus, no suggestion that intervening events had prevented the 
PBGC from prosecuting the case, and no hint that the PBGC had 
done anything except some limited discovery since the Court of 
Appeals ruled in 1988.  It inferred from this "at least an 
absence of a good faith effort to prosecute and a willful failure 
to act."  Michota, slip op. at 8. The PBGC argues that the court 
was improperly presuming willfulness or contumacity. 
 While there may have been an absence of a good faith 
effort to prosecute, this does not necessarily amount to 
willfulness or bad faith as this court has defined it.  The 
behavior here was different from the contumacious behavior in 
National Hockey League or Bedwell, where there were repeated and 
self-serving instances of flouting court authority and 
professional irresponsibility.  Rather, there is a resemblance to 
Donnelly, as circumstances here also "show a failure to move with 
the dispatch" reasonably expected of a party prosecuting a case. 
Donnelly, 677 F.2d at 342.  We will not call the PBGC's delay 
willful as there is no indication it was strategic or self-
serving.  Rather, it is a prime example of inexcusable negligent 
behavior. 
29 
  5.  Alternative sanctions 
a.   
 Before dismissing a case with prejudice, a district 
court should consider alternative sanctions.  In Titus v. 
Mercedes Benz, 695 F.2d 746, 748-49 (3d Cir. 1982), the district 
court dismissed the case after the plaintiffs repeatedly failed 
to prepare a draft pretrial order.  On appeal, we stated, 
"district courts should be reluctant to deprive a plaintiff of 
the right to have his claim adjudicated on the merits," id. at 
749, and held the district court was required to consider 
sanctions other than dismissal, id. at 750, and record its 
findings, id. at 751.  If further findings supported a dismissal 
with prejudice, the court could reinstate the dismissal with 
prejudice.  Id.; id. at 754 (Fullam, J., concurring).  In other 
cases, we have remanded for consideration of alternative 
sanctions with a bar on dismissal.  See, e.g., Donnelly, 677 F.2d 
at 344; Carter, 804 F.2d at 808. 
b. 
 The district court considered and rejected alternative 
sanctions.  While it noted it could charge the PBGC for the costs 
the Breweries incurred because of the delay, the court reasoned 
this would not compensate for the prejudice to the Breweries or 
the harm to the efficient administration of justice. 
 It has not been shown, however, that the Breweries' 
case has been seriously compromised.  Rather, we have found the 
delay caused no significant prejudice to the defendants.  Among 
other sanctions, favorable treatment for defendants on 
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evidentiary issues affected by the delay, if there are any, and 
payment of attorneys' fees and/or costs to the Breweries related 
to the delay might be appropriate here.  And while we join the 
district court's condemnation of the PBGC's irresponsibility 
toward the judicial process, we believe lesser sanctions will 
chasten effectively without the extreme result of "depriv[ing] 
the plaintiff of the right to have [its] claim adjudicated on the 
merits."  Titus, 695 F.2d at 749. 
  6.  Meritoriousness of the claim 
a. 
 The standard of meritoriousness when reviewing a 
dismissal is moderate: 
[W]e do not purport to use summary judgment 
standards.  A claim, or defense, will be 
deemed meritorious when the allegations of 
the pleadings, if established at trial, would 
support recovery by plaintiff or would 
constitute a complete defense. 
 
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-870.  Where a plaintiff makes out a prima 
facie case, but the defendant raises a prima facie defense, the 
factor may not weigh in favor of the plaintiff.  Id. at 870. 
b.   
 The district court found the facial meritoriousness of 
the PBGC's claims to be the one Poulis factor weighing against 
dismissal.  Pabst concedes this facial meritoriousness, although 
both Pabst and Anheuser-Busch reiterate their statutory and 
constitutional arguments against the applicability of ERISA. 
 We agree with the district court that the PBGC's claims 
are facially meritorious.  The district court rejected the 
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Breweries' statutory and constitutional defenses to liability. We 
then denied a request for interlocutory review, and denied the 
Breweries' motion for reconsideration and granted the PBGC 
summary judgment on the Breweries' cross-claims to reduce their 
ERISA liability.  We remanded the case "for a final determination 
of the employers' liability on PBGC's cross-claim for any 
remaining unfunded portions of the Brewery Pension Fund." Michota 
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 755 F.2d at 336.  Although Pabst argues 
that the district court can undo its previous decision on 
retroactive liability, the Breweries do not cite any new rulings 
on the issue.0  Because of the facial strength of the PBGC's 
case, the meritoriousness factor weighs heavily against 
dismissal.0 
                     
0Rather, they refer to general language from Henglein v. Informal 
Plan, 974 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1992), and dicta from Concrete Pipe 
and Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. 
Ct. 2264, 2293 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring), on retroactive 
application of ERISA.  Neither authority resolves this issue, or 
even applies directly. 
0The parties argue at length over whether, in light of two pre-
Poulis cases, the strength of the PBGC's case controls the 
decision regarding dismissal.  In Glo Co. v. Murchison & Co., 397 
F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam), aff'd on rehrg., 397 F.2d 
929 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939 
(1968), an action commenced in 1954 was dismissed after an order 
to show cause in 1963.  Although we noted that a dismissal 
"certainly seems justified by the inaction of counsel in failing 
to move for trial after repeated warnings," we reversed because 
"there appears to be no dispute that an amount of money is owed 
to plaintiff under the contracts in suit."  Id. at 929.  Glo Co. 
was followed in Spering v. Texas Butadiene & Chem. Co., 434 F.2d 
677 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), where an 
attorney sued a former client in 1965 for payment for services 
rendered between 1954 and 1964.  The defendants denied his claims 
except for services rendered after February, 1964.  Id. at 678. 
After a year of litigation, the plaintiff did virtually nothing 
in the case for three years, and the court dismissed in 1969. Id. 
at 680.  We found there had been no abuse of discretion and 
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VI. 
 Having considered the evidence before the district 
court when it dismissed this action with prejudice, we find the 
                                                                  
affirmed the dismissal, but also ruled that, because there was no 
dispute over the defendant's debt to plaintiff for services in 
1964, the plaintiff should be allowed to pursue that claim.  We 
then noted, without elaboration, that the "unusual nature of the 
circumstances" of Glo Co. was not present in Spering.  Id. at 
681. 
 Glo Co. and Spering do not purport to set out a rule, 
and at any rate the facts in this case are different in a 
critical way.  Here, unlike in Glo Co. and Spering, the 
defendants have not admitted liability.  We also note that those 
cases pre-date Poulis, and should not be taken to indicate that a 
court need not consider all six Poulis factors.  We do, however, 
endorse the general principle of Glo Co. and Spering, that where 
a party contesting dismissal has a strong case, the 
meritoriousness factor weighs more heavily in its favor. 
 The PBGC makes an additional argument regarding 
meritoriousness, that "absent truly extraordinary circumstances, 
no meritorious statutory claim of the federal government should 
be dismissed without prior warning."  Brief for Appellants at 42. 
It points to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(e), which bars default judgments 
against the United States "unless the claimant establishes a 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court", 
and the doctrine that the government is not subject to the 
defense of laches, see, e.g., United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 
117, 120 (3d Cir. 1969). 
 We cannot agree.  As Pabst points out, the reference to 
Rule 55(e) proves too much.  Rule 55 governs default judgments, 
and specifically excuses the government from its application 
under certain circumstances.  By contrast, Rule 41(b) specifies 
no exceptions for the government.  It is hard to avoid the 
implication that there is, then, no such exception to Rule 41(b). 
 Furthermore, this court and others have found Rule 
41(b) applicable to government agencies in the past.  For 
example, in Livera v First Nat'l State Bank, 879 F.2d 1186, 1193-
94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989), we remanded a 
41(b) dismissal of a claim by the Small Business Administration 
to the district court because the court had not applied the 
Poulis factors, and instructed the district court to determine 
whether dismissal was appropriate.  Id. at 1196; see also, e.g., 
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Power Resources Corp., 495 F.2d 
297, 298 (10th Cir. 1974) (affirming district court dismissal 
under Rule 41(b) of S.E.C. action for failure to prosecute). 
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sum of the six Poulis factors weighs against dismissal with 
prejudice, so that dismissal did not constitute the sound 
exercise of discretion.  In a close case, "doubts should be 
resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits." 
Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 878.  While we agree with the able and 
experienced district judge that the PBGC bears personal 
responsibility for the delay in prosecution, and also that there 
was a history of dilatoriness, these are outweighed by the 
absence of significant prejudice to the adversary and lack of 
willfulness or bad faith on the part of the PBGC, by the 
availability of alternative sanctions, and by the meritoriousness 
of the PBGC's claim.0  We share the frustration of the district 
court at the PBGC's irresponsible conduct, and acknowledge the 
court's thoughtful consideration of the many factors relevant to 
the issue of dismissal.  However, "[d]ismissal must be a sanction 
of last, not first, resort," Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869, and in this 
case lesser sanctions should be applied. 
 We will vacate the order of the district court and 
remand for reinstatement of the PBGC's claims and for the 
imposition of sanctions other than dismissal as appropriate. 
                     
0We have previously overturned a default judgment against a 
defendant on the same three grounds.  In Gross v. Stereo 
Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1983), we vacated the 
judgment "[b]ecause no prejudice accrued to the plaintiff, a 
potentially meritorious defense was available to the defendant, 
and defendant's conduct in failing to timely answer was not 
willful."  Donnelly is also similar to the instant case:  after 
finding neither willfulness by the attorney, prejudice to the 
adversary, nor personal responsibility on the part of the client 
with regard to the tardiness in finding local counsel, we ordered 
reinstatement of the case and consideration of lesser sanctions. 
Donnelly, 677 F.2d at 344. 
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 Each side to bear its own costs. 
